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A game theoretic analysis of the conditions of knowl-
edge transfer by new employees in companies* 
Abstract 
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competi-
tion.  Companies  realise  innovations  by  creating  and  implementing  new  knowledge. 
Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new em-
ployees  coming  from  another  company  or  academia.  Based  on  a  model  by 
HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are 
analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the com-
pany due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives 
which  motivate  the  employees  to  act  in  favour  of  the  company  by  providing  their 
knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theo-
retic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several 
factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These 
consist  mainly  of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The 
model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of 
the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an in-
novation (before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to 
each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is 
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the 
profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the 
absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. 
 
JEL classifications: C72, D83, O31 
Keywords: Knowledge Transfer, Innovation, Game Theory, Absorptive Capacity  
Zusammenfassung 
Die Verfügbarkeit von Wissen und die Fähigkeit zur schnellen Anwendung von wissen-
schaftlichen  Neuerungen  stellen  heute  einen  zentralen  Erfolgsfaktor  von  Volkswirt-
schaften dar. Unternehmen machen mit Wissensgenerierung und –umsetzung Innovatio-
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Ulrich Blum, Johannes Stephan and Birger Nerré for useful comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
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nen. Anregungen dazu kommen von Partnern im Produktionsnetzwerk, aber auch von 
neuen Mitarbeitern, die aus der Wissenschaft oder einem anderen Unternehmen in das 
Unternehmen kommen. Auf einem Modell von HECKATHORN (1996) basierend wer-
den die Bedingungen effizienten Wissenstransfers in einem Team untersucht. Da Wis-
sensweitergabe aufgrung von Informationsasymmetrien nicht kontrolliert werden kann, 
muß das Unternehmen entsprechende Anreize setzen. Diese lassen sich spieltheoretisch 
ermitteln. Mehrere Faktoren spielen eine Rolle, besonders wichtig sind die Kosten des 
einzelnen, die ihm bei der Teilnahme am Wissenstransfer entstehen. Das Absorptions-
vermögen und die Arbeitsatmosphäre bestimmen die Kosten in erster Linie. Das Modell 
ist ein 2x2-Spiel, das anschließend teilweise auf mehrere Spieler verallgemeinert wird. 
Die Relevanz der Teamgröße wird gezeigt und das vollständiger Wissenstransfer bei 
hohen individuellen Kosten nicht unbedingt gewinnmaximierend für das Unternehmen 
ist. Diese formalen Ergebnisse unterstützen vorhandene empirische zu Absortionsver-
mögen und Arbeitsatmosphäre.  
Wissenstransfer, Innovation, Spieltheorie, Absorptionsvermögen  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 3/2006  5
1.  Introduction 
The availability of knowledge and the ability to implement new knowledge into prod-
ucts and processes is essential for an economy to compete successfully in global mar-
kets.1 The crucial part in innovation is usually attributed to companies. They exploit 
their existing knowledge and assimilate new findings from external sources. The im-
plementation of new knowledge strengthens the position of the innovative company in 
its industry as well as the economy as a whole in global competition. An important 
source for innovations are suggestions of incumbent employees and partners in the pro-
duction network (e.g. suppliers and customers) as well as the engagement of highly 
qualified people. They may have worked in another company before or, if the company 
is part of a multinational enterprise, may come from another subsidiary. A further source 
is a scientist leaving academia to work in the industry, which is a significant transfer 
channel with an even increasing importance for CZARNITZKI et al. (2000, p. 18). The 
essential point is that the new employee has new knowledge, which is not yet available 
in the company and rarely or not available anywhere else. COHEN and LEVINTHAL 
(1990) argue that a firm’s ability to exploit external knowledge is a critical component 
of innovative capabilities (p. 128). If the knowledge is transferred and implemented – 
thus becoming an innovation –, it is possible to make additional profits by selling a new 
useful product to customers or to get a more competitive position in the industry by re-
ducing process costs.2 
This paper analyses the conditions of such knowledge transfer and the incentives a com-
pany can offer to influence knowledge transfer and to optimise profits gained by innova-
tions due to sufficient transfer. Therefore a game theoretic model is developed on the 
basis of a model by HECKATHORN (1996). The new model shows the relevance of 
additional rewards for the employees engaged in the innovation process, the size of the 
team, and, most importantly, the individual costs of participating in knowledge transfer. 
These costs consist mainly of the effort to understand (or in the case of providing the 
knowledge: to explain) the new information, to connect it with existing knowledge and 
to apply it. COHEN and LEVINTHAL introduced the concept of absorptive capacity to 
explain how a person or a team is able to learn something from an external source. The 
                                                 
1  The European Council stated in March 2000 in the Lisbon Strategy that the aim for the EU is “to be-
come the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustain-
able economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The importance of 
knowledge, and innovations resulting from it, for economic growth is not only an assumption of pol-
icy,  but  also  a  fact  for  authors  like  e.g.  DAVID  and  FORAY  (1995),  AGRAWAL  (2001)  and 
EGELN, GOTTSCHALK et al. (2003). 
2  The assumption that new knowledge leads to innovations is used here as it is common in innovation 
literature. Of course a failure is possible even with great effort to implement new knowledge. In this 
paper the success of an innovation generated by knowledge transfer is assumed, because otherwise 
the company cannot set incentives which are part of the profit made with an innovation.  
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ability to exploit external knowledge is mainly a function of the level of existing related 
knowledge and consists of the competence “to recognise the value of new information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p. 128). The idea behind this is that the 
more you know the better you are able to learn or adopt something new. 
Literature review 
Several authors studied the importance of the absorptive capacity empirically. LANE et 
al. (2001) analyse international joint ventures and demonstrate a positive association be-
tween knowledge from foreign parents and the joint venture’s performance. The level of 
competence  in  training  and  personnel  development  improves  performance  as  well. 
MINBAEVA et al. (2003) divide absorptive capability into the ability and the motiva-
tion to learn. They show empirically that both these factors enhance knowledge transfer. 
GUPTA and GOVINDARAJAN (2000) find for multinational corporation subsidiaries a 
positive relationship between absorptive capacity (measured by overlapping know-how) 
and knowledge inflows. Performance-based payment as a motivation to transfer also in-
fluences knowledge inflows positively. A positive influence of monetary incentives on 
working effort – even in situations with information asymmetries – was found long be-
fore e. g. by MALCOMSON (1984). 
Closely connected with the concept of absorptive capacity is the phenomena of tacit 
knowledge first mentioned by POLANYI (1966). Tacit knowledge is partly or wholly 
inexplicable and can only be communicated by direct involvement of the knowledge 
provider or gained by personal experience. For efficient knowledge transfer it is neces-
sary that both tacit and explicit knowledge are transferred at the same time. Therefore, 
personal interaction is crucial. NELSON and WINTER (1982) state that transferring 
tacit knowledge may be more complex for different reasons, especially the teaching of 
skills requires a higher time-rate of information transfer and the coherence of the knowl-
edge structure makes the components useless when neglecting the whole. DHANARAJ 
et al. (2004) show a direct impact of tacit knowledge on explicit knowledge. Explicit 
knowledge in turn has a positive impact on performance. They cannot show this directly 
for tacit knowledge, but SUBRAMANIAM and VENKATRAMAN (2001) do. They 
analysed product innovations and found that the ability to transfer and use tacit knowl-
edge  significantly  influences  the  transnational  product  development  capabilities. 
NONAKA and TAKEUCHI (1995) hold that at least half of all knowledge is implicit 
and for transferring it, employees have to work closely together and trust each other. 
Thus the working atmosphere influences knowledge transfer. Finally BUCKLEY and 
CARTER (2004) analyse amongst other things the influence of the working atmosphere 
on knowledge transfer in multinational enterprises and state that “[a] culture of mutual 
trust is probably the most important requirement for the promotion of knowledge ex-
change” (p. 380).  
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In this paper, the issue of knowledge transfer is assessed from the point of view of the 
incentive structure for knowledge providing (and receiving) employees. This incentive 
structure is treated at the firm level, i. e. within the power of individual firms to deter-
mine the optimal use of knowledge potentials and to earn additional profits through in-
novations. Following the research on absorptive capacity it is assumed that the individ-
ual costs of participating in the transfer of knowledge are determined to a large extent by 
absorptive capacity and working atmosphere. The relation between the costs of knowl-
edge transfer and the rewards the employees earn by the implementation of an innova-
tion determine the effort of the employees in knowledge transfer.  
The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players in order to 
show the relevance of the team size. In the model, a researcher or developer with dis-
tinct new knowledge comes into a company, a common situation. Offering knowledge 
to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asym-
metries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees 
to act in favour of the company and by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team 
and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating 
how to arrange these incentives efficiently and what conditions influence knowledge 
transfer. 
The paper has the following structure: In the second section the model of Heckathorn is 
presented and how it can be adapted to the problem. It s shown how a company can op-
timise knowledge transfer. In the third section a partly generalisation on more than two 
players is develoled and the fourth section concludes.  
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2.  The game theoretic model 
HECKATHORN (1996) developed a model about “The dynamics and dilemmas of col-
lective action”, where he analyses how a society or any other group produces a public 
commodity.  This  model  is  described  shortly  and  isthen  adapted  to  the  problem  of 
knowledge transfer.  






  = - 
 
  (1) 
L is the level of production (that can reach 100 per cent at maximum), d the numbers of 
defectors and n the number of players. F defines the shape of the production function. F 
is always greater than zero, i. e. the production function is increasing (more input = 
more output). If nobody cooperates, d = n and no commodity is produced. For d = 0 the 
production is at maximum because everybody cooperates. 
The payoff function for each person is 
U V L c = × - ,  (2) 
with V as the value of the whole production of the public commodity and c as the indi-
vidual costs of cooperation for each person. The costs c depend on working conditions3, 
but not on the number of cooperating people. 
For simplicity a symmetrical 2 2 ´  game is assumed, i. e. two players with two possibili-
ties to act (to cooperate or not). In a one-time game the row player has the following 
payoffs (the values for the column player are analogue):  
Figure 1:  
Payoff matrix of player 1  
 
0  V(1  -  0,5  F   ) 
V(1  -  0,5  F   )  -  c  V  -  c 
0  V(1  -  0,5  F   ) 
V(1  -  0,5  F   )  -  c  V  -  c 
A   C   









Source: Heckathorn, 1996, p. 256, table 1. 
                                                 
3  The determinants of the working conditions are explained in more detail in the following section.  
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Depending on the specification of the model determinants five situations can arise, that 
differ in the height of the payoffs and therefore the preferred order of the different op-
tions of action. 
–  Privileged Game: the dominant strategy is to cooperate, what is individually and so-
cially the best. Thus there is no problem as long as the players do not want to harm 
each other.  
–  Prisoner’s Dilemma: both players would profit the most when cooperating, but when 
they individually optimise their behaviour both will defect and the payoff will be at 
minimum. Defecting is a dominant strategy. 
–  Chicken Game: for each player it would be best if only the other one cooperates, but 
if the other one defects it is still better to cooperate than to defect as well. 
–  Assurance Game: parallel behaviour is better than unilateral cooperation. Each player 
does what he thinks the other one does. 
–  Altruist’s Dilemma: in fact there is no “dilemma”, because it is individually and so-
cially best not to cooperate. Only if the players are altruists and think they help the 
other person when cooperating an inefficient solution arises. In sociology this might 
be a dilemma but in economics this situation can not occur under the assumption of 
rational acting people and the assumption of effort necessary for knowledge transfer 
(see below). 
F shapes the production function. If it is greater than 1, returns to scale are decreasing, 
between 0 and 1 there are economies of scale (increasing returns to scale). In the first 
case every additional cooperating person adds less to the level of production. In the case 
of economies of scale every additional person adds more to the production. In this case 
only a high degree of cooperation will lead to a reasonable level of production. 
Adapting the model for knowledge transfer 
The model becomes useful for the analysis described the situation of a new employee 
coming into a team, if a company is viewed as an economy with N employees and L as a 
new product or process that leads to additional sales. It can only be produced with im-
plementing the knowledge from the new team member. The additional effort made by 
the employees for transferring knowledge is c. They get additional utility by participat-
ing in the profit made with the new product. Let this additional wage be V in case of full 
production and respectively lower if the level of production is less than one hundred per 
cent. The overall profit Pwhole is divided into a part the company gets Pcom  and a part for 




= . It is assumed that knowledge transfer only occurs with some effort. This as- 
sumption was also made by BUCKLEY and CARTER (2004). The new employee needs 
to explain and to show his special knowledge, the effort of the existing colleagues is to 
understand and learn what is shown to them. Both have to combine old and new knowl-
edge to get a new combination that leads to the innovation. The effort is influenced by  
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longer working time as well as the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. As 
described before, the absorptive capacity determines the ability to learn and the working 
atmosphere influences strongly the motivation to learn and teach. 
Two restrictive assumptions must be made compared to the original model. The Altru-
ist’s Dilemma will not arise. It implies higher individual costs than additional wage. Ac-
cording to the rationale of the model, I assume that rationally acting employee would not 
cooperate in this case, because it means that making an effort to transfer knowledge 
leads to a successful innovation but the company does not pay the employees for it. The 
other assumption is that the production function of innovative products has decreasing 
returns to scale. If one thinks of the production function as proportional to the cumula-
tive  knowledge  of  the  employees,  the  assumption  is  feasible.  There  is  some  basic 
knowledge everybody has. Then everyone has additional knowledge, part of it may be 
already available by someone else. Thus the probability that the knowledge of a new 
team member is already known increases with the number of group members and every 
new person accounts for a smaller part of the cumulative knowledge. The redundant 
knowledge is necessary for the communication within the team but it decreases produc-
tivity. New insights may be generated by group work but this effect is smaller than the 
decreasing productivity caused by redundant knowledge. 
If parallel cooperation is called A (as in figure 1), cooperation only by player 1 C, coop-
eration only by the second player B, and parallel non-cooperation D the following situa-
tions occur (illustrated in figure 2): 
Privileged Game (PG) 
The payoff of player 1 is by definition of the PG ranked A > B and C > D. 
(1 0.5 )
F V c V - > -  and   (3) 
(1 0.5 ) 0
F V c - - >   (4) 
This results in 
0.5
F c V < ×  Û  0.5
F c
V
<  and  (5) 
(1 0.5 )
F V c - >  Û  1 0.5
F c
V
< - .  (6) 
The PG emerges if the rate of additional costs to additional wage is smaller than the two 
thresholds of (5) and (6). Which one is relevant in a special case depends on the shape  
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of the production function F. The rate of c to V can not be greater than 0.5 in the Privi-
leged Game. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
The payoff of player 1 is by definition of the PD ranked B > A > D > C. 
(1 0.5 ) 0 (1 0.5 )
F F V V c V c - > - > > - -   (7) 
This results in 
V c > ,  (8) 
(1 0.5 )
F V c - <  Û  1 0.5
F c
V
> -  and  (9) 
0.5
F V c × <  Û  0.5
F c
V
> .  (10) 
The same two thresholds as in the PG apply for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, now as the 
lower limits. The PD emerges with a high rate of additional costs to additional wage, but 
still the additional wage is greater than the individual costs. 
Chicken Game (CG) 
The payoff of player 1 is by definition of the CG ranked B > A and C > D. 
(1 0.5 )
F V V c - > -   and    (11) 
(1 0.5 ) 0
F V c - - >   (12) 
This results in 
(1 0.5 )
F V V c - > -  Û  0.5
F c
V
>  and  (13) 
(1 0.5 )
F V c - >  Û  1 0.5
F c
V
< - .  (14) 
The Chicken Game emerges if the rate of additional costs to additional wage lies in be-
tween certain limits. This implies decreasing returns to scale, i. e. an F > 1. Compared  
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with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rate of additional costs to additional wage is lower, but 
it is still greater than in the Privileged Game. 
Assurance Game (AG) 
The payoff of player 1 is by definition of the AG ranked A > D > C and A > B. 
0 (1 0.5 )
F V c V c - > > - -  and   (15) 
(1 0.5 )
F V c V - > -   (16) 
This results in 
V c > ,  (17) 
(1 0.5 )
F c V > -  Û  1 0.5
F c
V
> -  and  (18) 
0.5
F c V < ×  Û  0.5
F c
V
< .  (19) 
Figure 2:  
Illustration of the five situations dependent on additional individual costs c, additional 
wage V and the shape of the production function F 
    
0    
0,5    
1    
1,5    
0     1     2     F    
c/V    
c = V    
F = 1    
AG    
PD    
CG    
PG    
AD    
     
10,5    
F     c    
V    
=-          
0,5    
F     c    
V    
=          
 
AD = Altruist’s Dilemma, PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma, AG = Assurance Game, CG = Chicken Game, PG = Privileged 
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Again the rate of additional costs to additional wage lies in between certain limits. This 
time a production function with increasing returns to scale is implied, i. e. F < 1. This 
was excluded by the assumptions in the beginning and no Assurance Game can arise. 
Equally the Altruist’s Dilemma can not arise. 
The lines in figure 2 represent the borders between the presented situations. The dashed 
line divides increasing from decreasing returns to scale and the horizontal line c = V 
shows the upper limit of the rate of additional costs to additional wage. Thus the rele-
vant part of the graphic is the rectangle in the lower right. With a decreasing ratio of c to 
V it is possible to come from the Prisoner’s Dilemma through the Chicken Game to the 
Privileged Game where knowledge transfer is complete. 
Optimisation in the company’s perspective 
In order to optimise knowledge transfer from highly qualified new employees to other 
team members as a basis for economic success the rate of additional costs to additional 
wage must be low. Either the costs are low or the wage compensation is high. As men-
tioned in the introduction the stock of knowledge affects strongly the absorptive capac-
ity, i. e. the ability to understand and implement something new increases with existing 
knowledge. Furthermore a good working atmosphere as well decreases the costs of co-
operation, with mutual trust the employees feel less effort to exchange knowledge.4 
By means of the HECKATHORN model the relevant area for full knowledge transfer 
was found. The area is defined by the two inequations F > 1 and  0,5
F c
V
< . It is possi- 
ble to determine an optimal behaviour of the company. If c is fixed, the company should 
set the additional wage V as small as possible to still satisfy the inequation. Let us take 
the assumption that a player cooperates when the utility of cooperation is equal to that of 






V c = = ×   (20) 
This additional wage is paid to both players. It is part of the overall profit Pwhole the 
company will earn with the new product or process if every player would cooperate. The 
payment to the developers reduces Pwhole. The company thus earns 
1 2 2 2
F F
com whole whole P P c P c
+ = - × × = - ×   (21) 
Equation (21) shows that the employees’ costs c reduce the profit of the company. Op-
timizing the income means reducing the additional costs of the employees as long as the 
                                                 
4  See Buckley and Carter (2004).  
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company increases the profit more than the cost reduction costs k. A given c represents 
the actual costs of knowledge transfer, determined by the qualification of the employees, 
the mutual trust and the efficiency of the organisational structures. If these costs are 
high, it will be easy to reduce them a little, for example by further education or confi-
dence-building measures. If the costs are low already, more effort is necessary to re-
duces them further until y point where more reduction is not possible. So the function of 
k(c) is convex, and zero at the actual costs c0. 
The marginal income of the company is 
1 ( ) 2
F
com P c
+ ¢ = -   (22) 
A reduction of c by one entity increases Pcom by 
1 2
F+  entities. As long as k < 
1 2
F+ , a re-
duction of c is rational. The optimum is reached at k = 
1 2
F+ . Then the profit of the com-
pany is at maximum and the knowledge transfer is efficient.  
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3.  More Players 
An innovation usually can be attributed to a team, but not to individual members of that 
team. Such a research team consists of a certainly limited number of developers, be-
cause a special question is never analysed by a large group. Large groups have smaller 
entities responsible for a certain task. And their work can be distinguished from that of 
others. Thus these smaller entities are the relevant team size for the transfer problem de-
scribed above. For a group of about five members the assumption of a symmetrical 
game can still be uphold.  
The border between the Privileged Game and the Chicken Dilemma was  0,5
F c
V






  =  
 
Û 
F V cn = , because it is the border between no defector and 
one defector. The company’s profit function changes to 
1 F F
com whole whole P P n cn P cn
+ = - × = -   (23) 
Pwhole is not independent of the team size n: It will increase concavely up to an upper 
limit and can decrease again when the coordination of the team becomes difficult and 
information flows become complex due to the number of team members. 
Figure 3:  
Profit function of the company for two different n with n1 < n2. 
c
P
P w h o le
P c o m (c ,n 1)
P c o m (c ,n 2)
c
P
P w h o le
P c o m (c ,n 1)
P c o m (c ,n 2)
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In order to realise the same profit with a larger team the company has to decrease the in-
dividual costs of the team members. As mentioned above decreasing the additional costs 
creates new costs k. The smaller c is already, the higher k will be. As long as c is high,  
it is not difficult to decrease it, and it could even occur that it is possible to save money  












>  and if c0 denotes the current situation, 
k(c0) = 0. The profit for the company including the consideration of reducing the indi-
vidual costs c is 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k F
com com whole P c P c k c P cn k c
+ = - = - - .  (24) 
Figure 4:  































Given costs are c0. The dashed arrow shows the profit of the company when considering a shift of c. Maximum profit 
is realised for the company where the difference between Pcom and k is largest. In the right situation this optimum is 
reached by increasing c.  
The optimal costs c for the company are reached, when 
1 ( ) F com dP dk c
n
dc dc
+ = = - . 
It is also possible that a situation arises where the costs are so high, that there is no posi-
tive difference between Pcom and k (see fig. 5). In this case the Privileged Game is no 
longer the best game. If fewer team members cooperate, Pwhole decreases – the produc-
tion level is not at 100 per cent –, but so does V. Let not the border between no and one 
defector be relevant, but the one between one and two defectors, i. e. a kind of chicken 
game (CG) is best for the company’s profit. For every person – knowing that one will 
defect – it is better to cooperate, as long as 
1 2




    - - > -    
   
.  (25)  
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  (26) 
which is smaller than V in the case of the Privileged Game. 
Figure 5:  
The situation that a Chicken Dilemma (CD) is better for knowledge transfer than the 

























These considerations show the relevance of the team size and the structure of the costs 
each employee faces for knowledge transfer: 
–  If the individual costs of knowledge transfer are high or a reduction is expensive, 
there will be no complete knowledge transfer. 
–  If the size of the team increases, the profit of the company decreases and it can occur 
that knowledge transfer is no perfect, when the company optimises profit. 
There is an optimal development team size for the company, which is determined by dif-
ferent factors: on the one hand Pwhole that increases with the number of team members as 
long as n is small. On the other hand the increasing (in n) wage payments that in turn 
depend on the costs c. The company has to decide about this optimal team size and 
wether it is efficient to aim at complete knowledge transfer. The better an innovation 
can be attributed to the relevant persons, the higher the profit will be because in the op-
timum nobody is paid who has not contributed to the innovation.  
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4.  Conclusions 
The analysis shows how a company earns the optimal profit from a new employee who 
has knowledge that is not yet established in the company under the assumption that 
broadening the knowledge base leads to innovations. The incentives were divided in 
monetary incentives modelled as the additional wage and motivational incentives in-
cluded in the costs of effort. It was shown that efficient knowledge transfer only occurs 
at a low rate of additional costs to additional wages. The individual costs thereby consist 
mainly of the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. If the costs of coopera-
tion are to high, complete knowledge transfer will not occur. The importance of the ab-
sorptive capacity for knowledge transfer found empirically by MINBAEVA et al. could 
be confirmed formally.  The same holds true for the working atmosphere as it was found 
by BUCKLEY and CARTER. Furthermore the size of the team involved in producing 
an innovation as a highly relevant factor was identified. The partly generalisation of the 
model on more players shows the relevance of the adequate team size. More developers 
may increase the total profit of an innovation (before paying the involved people) but 
when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining 
company profit.  
Of course there are some limitations of the model presented. (i) It applies only for the 
assumption of rationally acting people. (ii) There is uncertainty about the profit of an in-
novation, in the worst case an innovation could fail totally. (iii) The model cannot be 
wholly generalised on every number of players because of complexity but this limitation 
holds for all game theoretic models. 
Nevertheless I hope to contribute to the research about knowledge transfer and the im-
portance of absorptive capacity. Further research could e. g. analyse the knowledge gap 
between the new employee and the incumbent and if it depends on the origin of the em-
ployee – there might be a greater distance between incumbent employees and scientists 
compared with employees coming from another company.  
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